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Abstract
We consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a rm
in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a pollut-
ing technology that uses fossil energy. However, these rms can adopt a
clean technology that uses a renewable energy and that has a lower unit
cost. Surprisingly, opening markets to international competition increases
the per-unit emission-tax and decreases the per-unit production subsidy.
Interestingly, the socially-optimal adoption date under a common mar-
ket better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky,
and than the optimal adoption date of regulated rms. However, the op-
timal adoption date of non-regulated rms completely dont internalize
transboundary pollution. In autarky (resp. a common market), regulated
rms adopt earlier (resp. later) than what is socially-optimal, whereas
non-regulated rms adopt later than the socially-optimal adoption date
and than the optimal adoption date of regulated rms. Therefore, in au-
tarky (resp. a common market) regulators can induce rms to adopt at
the socially-optimal adoption date by giving them postpone ( resp. speed
up) adoption subsidies. Opening markets to international trade, speeds
up the socially-optimal adoption date and delays optimal adoption dates
of regulated and non-regulated rms.
Keywords: Regulation, Adoption date, Renewable energy, Transbound-
ary pollution, Common market, .
JEL classication : D62, F18, H57, Q42, Q55.
1 Introduction
This paper tries to study the relation that may exist between the timing of
adoption of clean technologies, transboundary pollution and opening markets
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to international competition. Typical examples of clean production technolo-
gies are those using renewable energy such as solar energy, whereas polluting
production technologies usually use fossil energy. Our research is related to at
least four literature elds.
The rst eld deals with renewable energies and clean technologies. Dosi
and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a rm which can switch to a clean
technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. To bridge the gap be-
tween the private and the policy-makers desired timing of innovation, they
recommended that the regulator stimulate the innovation by subsidies and by
reducing the uncertainty concerning the protability of the clean technology by
appropriate announcements. Dosi and Moretto (2010) extended the previous
study to oligopolistic rms and studied the incentives of not being the rst rm
adopting the clean technology. Soest (2005) analyzed the impact of environmen-
tal taxes and quotas on the timing of adoption and found that neither policy
instrument is always preferred to the other. Nasiri and Zaccour (2009) proposed
a game-theoretic model and analyzed the process of utilizing biomass for power
generation. They considered three players: distributor, facility developer, and
participating farmer, characterized the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and
discussed its features. Wirl and Withagen (2000) showed that pollution-control
policy is not necessarily optimal in the sense of giving the social optimum.
Fischer, Withagen and Toman (2004) developed a model of a uniform good
that can be produced by either a polluting or a clean technology, and showed
that the optimal transition path is quite di¤erent with a clean or polluting ini-
tial environment. Ben Youssef (2010) showed that the instantaneous regulated
monopoly adopts the clean technology earlier than what is socially-optimal,
while the non-regulated monopoly adopts later than what is socially-optimal.
The regulator can induce the monopoly to adopt at the socially-optimal date
by a postpone adoption subsidy. Fujiwara (2011) developed a dynamic game
model of an asymmetric oligopoly with a renewable resource and showed that
increasing the number of e¢ cient rms reduces welfare. Reichenbach and Re-
quate (2012) considered a model with two types of electricity producers and
showed that a rst-best policy requires a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an
output subsidy for the renewable energy sources sector.
Many empirical studies have been interested in clean technologies, among
which Whitehead and Cherry (2007), Varun et al. (2009), Li et al. (2009)
and Caspary (2009). For instance, Pillai and Banerjee (2009) reviewed the
status and potential of di¤erent renewable energies (except biomass) in India
and constructed a di¤usion model as a basis for setting targets.
The second eld deals with transboundary pollution. Chander and Tulkens
(1992) showed that non-cooperating behavior of countries is not Pareto-optimal.
Mansouri and Ben Youssef (2000) showed the necessity of cooperation between
countries to e¤ectively internalize all the transboundary pollution, while reach-
ing the rst best. Nevertheless, some studies showed that non-cooperating
countries can reach the rst best under some conditions (Hoel (1997), Zag-
onari (1998)). Ben Youssef (2009) showed that free R&D spillovers and the
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competition of rms on the common market help non-cooperating countries to
better internalize transfrontier pollution. Ben Youssef (2011) established that
the investment in absorptive R&D enables non-cooperating regulators to better
internalize transfrontier pollution.
The third eld deals with international trade. Because pollution crosses the
borders, Copeland and Taylor (1995) showed that uncoordinated regulation of
pollution at the national level and free trade dont necessarily raise welfare.
Under incomplete information, Péchoux and Pouyet (2003) showed that rms
competition generated by the common market enables regulators to reduce the
informational rents captured by rms, thereby reinforcing the need to open
the markets to international trade. Using a static model with no investment
possibility in cleaner production technology, Cremer and Gahvari (2004) showed
that rms switch to a less polluting but more costly production technique, under
economic integration.
The fourth eld deals with the timing of adoption of new technologies. The
di¤usion of a new technology has been analyzed by Reinganum (1981). She
considered an industry composed of two rms which can adopt a cost reducing
technology within a period of time. She showed that even in the case of identical
rms and complete information, there is di¤usion of innovation over time be-
cause one rm innovates before the other and gains more. Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) made less strong conditions on the payo¤s of rms and showed that under
certain conditions there is di¤usion, whereas under other conditions rms adopt
this new technology simultaneously. Hoppe (2000) extended the work of Fu-
denberg and Tirole to include uncertainty regarding the protability of the new
technology. She showed that there may be second-mover advantages because
of informational spillovers. Dutta et al. (1995) got a similar result in a context
where the later innovator continues to develop the technology and eventually
markets a higher-quality good. Riordan (1992) showed that price and entry
regulations, in many cases, benecially slow down technology adoption and, in
some other cases, change the order in which rms adopt new technologies by
speeding up one rms adoption date and slowing down the others. Milliou
and Petrakis (2011) showed that when goods are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, the
adoption of a new technology occurs later than is socially-optimal.
Our paper di¤ers from the existing literature by the fact that we try to know
how the adoption dates of clean technologies may be a¤ected when markets are
opened to international competition, and how the regulator may change his
behavior with respect to rms he is regulating. Also, in the present paper, we
study the relation between the adoption of clean technologies and transboundary
pollution.
We consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a monopolis-
tic rm operating in each country. Firms produce the same homogeneous good
by using a polluting technology that uses fossil energy. However, these rms can
adopt a new and clean production technology by incurring an investment cost
that decreases exponentially with the adoption date. This clean technology uses
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a renewable energy and therefore has a lower unit production cost. We study
and compare the case where rms are not regulated at all, and the case where
each rm is regulated at each period of time i.e. each non-cooperating regulator
looks for static social optimality. In this latter case, a per-unit emission-tax
is used when a rm uses the polluting technology, and a per-unit production
subsidy, than can be considered as a scal incentive, is used when a rm uses
the clean technology. We also study and compare the case where each rm
operates in a separate home market, and the case where rms compete in the
same common market formed by the consumers of the two countries.
In autarky, since our model is symmetric, rms adopt the clean technology
simultaneously. However, in a common market, and because of the competition
between rms, we impose a condition on parameters to avoid the complicated
case where rms adopt at di¤erent dates, and we show that adoption is simul-
taneous.
When markets are opened to international competition, the per-unit emission-
tax increases when the polluting technology is used, and the per-unit production
subsidy decreases when the clean technology is used. These results are inter-
esting and even surprising because one may think that, to give a competitive
advantage to its domestic rm, each regulator reduces the per-unit emission-
tax and increases the per-unit production subsidy, when markets are opened to
international trade. Ben Youssef (2009) found similar results with a di¤erent
model where regulatory instruments are a per-unit emission-tax and a per-unit
R&D subsidy.
Interestingly, the socially-optimal adoption date under a common market
better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky, and than
the optimal adoption date of regulated rms. However, the optimal adoption
date of non-regulated rms completely dont internalize transboundary pollu-
tion. Therefore, the regulator should know how to intervene to get rms adopt
at the socially-optimal dates. This result is of great interest because this paper is
the rst attempt linking the adoption of clean technologies with transboundary
pollution. Notice that, using very di¤erent models than the present, Ben Youssef
(2009) showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of rms on the common
market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pol-
lution, and Ben Youssef (2011) showed that the investment in absorptive R&D
help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution.
The intervention of regulators on how to induce rms adopting the clean
technology at the socially-optimal adoption date completely changes when mar-
kets are opened to international competition. Indeed, in autarky (resp. common
market), regulated rms adopt earlier (resp. later) than what is socially-optimal,
whereas non-regulated rms adopt later than the socially-optimal adoption date
and than the optimal adoption date of regulated rms. Therefore, in autarky,
regulators can induce rms to adopt at the socially-optimal adoption date by
giving them a postpone adoption subsidy. However, in common market, regula-
tors can induce rms to adopt at the socially-optimal adoption date by giving
them a speed up adoption subsidy.
International competition reduces the instantaneous gain from using the
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clean technology of non-regulated and regulated rms, with respect to autarky.
Consequently, non-regulated and regulated rms delay the adoption of the clean
technology when markets are opened to international trade. However, the in-
stantaneous social welfare gain from the adoption of the clean technology in-
creases with market opening, leading to an early socially-optimal adoption date
under a common market. These results are new and interesting because the im-
pact of opening markets to international competition on the timing of adoption
of clean technologies has not been previously studied.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the autarky case.
Section 3 deals with the common market case, and Section 4 compares the two
market regimes. Section 5 concludes and an Appendix contains some proofs.
2 Autarky
We consider a symmetric model consisting of two countries and two rms. Firm
i located in country i is a regional monopoly and produces good i in quantity
qi sold in the domestic market with the inverse demand function: pi = a  2qi;
a > 0:Thus, the market size of each country is a=2.
The consumption of qi engenders a consumerssurplus in country i equal to:
CSai (qi) =
qiZ
0
pi(z)dz   pi(qi)qi = q2i
At the beginning of the game i.e. at date 0, rms produce goods by using
an old and polluting production technology using fossil fuels and characterized
by a positive emission/output ratio e > 0. The pollution emitted by rm i is
Ei = eqi.
We suppose that pollution crosses the borders and that damages in country
i are due to the domestic pollution and the foreign pollution: Di = Ei + Ej ,
where  > 0 is the marginal damage of domestic pollution and  > 0 is the
marginal damage of foreign pollution.
When rm i uses the polluting technology, its unit production cost is d > 0
and its prot1 is aid = pi(qi)qi   dqi.
Each rm i behaves for an innite horizon of time and can adopt a clean
production technology within a period of time  i. This clean technology does
not pollute at all, uses a renewable energy and therefore has a lower unit cost of
production c verifying 0 < c < d. Thus, the prot of rm i is aic = pi(qi)qi cqi.
We suppose that the marginal damage of production e is neither too small
nor too high verifying the following condition:
d  c
3
< e < d  c (1)
1 In what follows, the subscripts d and c refer to the polluting and clean technologies,
respectively. The superscripts a and cm refer to the autarky and common market cases,
respectively.
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The instantaneous social welfare of country i is equal to the consumers
surplus, minus damages plus the prot of the domestic rm:
Sai (qi; qj) = CS
a
i (qi) Di(qi; qj) + ai (qi) (2)
To get the new and clean production technology, an investment cost is nec-
essary. This latter could comprise the R&D cost or the cost of acquisition and
installation of the clean technology.
The cost of adopting the clean technology by rm i at date  i actualized at
date 0 is:
V ( i) = e
 mr i , (3)
with  > 0 is the cost of immediate adoption of the clean technology, r > 0
is the discount rate, and the parameter m denotes that the cost of adoption
decreases more rapidly when it is greater. We assume that m > 1.2
Function V is decreasing due to the existence of freely-available scientic
research enabling a rm to reduce the cost of adopting the clean technology
when it delays its adoption, and is convex because the adoption cost increases
more rapidly when a rm tries to accelerate the adoption date.
Lets remark that  i = +1 means that rm i will never adopt the clean
technology.
2.1 Non-regulated rms
In this section, we study the case where, at each period of time, each rm is not
regulated even when it uses the polluting technology.
When both rms use the polluting technology, then each one maximizes its
prot naidd to get the optimal level of production:
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qnaidd =
a  d
4
> 0 (4)
When both rms use the clean technology, then each one maximizes its prot
naicc to get the optimal level of production:
qnaicc =
a  c
4
> 0 (5)
It is easy to verify that qnaicc > q
na
idd meaning that rms produce more with
the clean technology because of its lower unit production cost:
If only rm 1 adopts the clean technology and rm 2 still uses the polluting
technology, then the prots of rms are denoted by na1cd(q1) and 
na
2cd(q2),
respectively. Optimal production quantities for rms are given by:
qna1cd =
a  c
4
> 0; qna2cd =
a  d
4
> 0 (6)
2This assumption is necessary for the optimal adoption dates to be positive. Moreover, it
guarantees the second-order condition when determining the optimal adoption dates (see the
Appendix).
3The superscript n refers to the non-regulation case.
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We can verify that qna1cd = q
na
1cc; q
na
2cd = q
na
2dd and that q
na
1cd > q
na
2cd:Thus, the
rm using the clean technology produces more than that using the polluting
technology.
2.2 Regulated rms
In this section, we study the case where rms are regulated at each period of
time. First, we start by determining the socially-optimal production quantities
for each regulator. Then, we determine the regulatory instruments inducing the
socially-optimal production quantities in each country.
When both rms use the polluting technology, the instantaneous social wel-
fare of country i is:
Saidd(qi; qj) = CS
a
i (qi) Di(qi; qj) + aidd(qi) (7)
Maximizing the expression given by (7) with respect to qi gives the socially-
optimal production level with the polluting technology for each regulator i =
1; 2:
q^aidd =
a  d  e
2
(8)
We assume the rst inequality of the following condition such that produc-
tion quantities are positive. Also, the second inequality is assumed to avoid
studying the complicated case of non-simultaneous adoption of the clean tech-
nology in the common market case. Moreover, the second inequality of (1)
assures that there is no contradiction in inequality (9) :
d+ e < a < 2d  c (9)
Therefore, the maximum willingness to pay for the good must be higher than
the marginal cost of production plus the marginal damage of production.
Since each rm is a polluting monopoly, it is regulated. An emission-tax
per-unit of pollution taidd is su¢ cient to induce the socially-optimal levels of
production and pollution.
The instantaneous net prot of rm i is:
Uaidd(qi) = 
a
idd(qi)  taiddEi(qi) (10)
The socially-optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces rm i to produce
q^aidd is:
taidd =
a  d  4q^aidd
e
(11)
Using the expression of q^aidd, we can show that:
taidd > 0() a < d+ 2e (12)
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When e > d c2 i.e. the marginal damage of pollution is high enough,
the above condition is always satised and the emission-tax is positive. When
e < d c2 and a < d+2e, the emission-tax is positive. However, when e <
d c
2
and a > d + 2e i.e. the marginal damage of pollution is low enough, the
emission-tax is negative meaning that each regulator subsidizes production to
deal with monopoly distortion.
If both rms use the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare of
country i is:
Saicc(qi) = CS
a
i (qi) + 
a
icc(qi) (13)
Maximizing the expression given by (13) with respect to qi gives the socially-
optimal production level with the clean technology for regulator i:
q^aicc =
a  c
2
> 0 (14)
Using the second inequality of (1), we show that q^aicc > q^
a
idd. Therefore, the
clean technology enables to produce more and without polluting the environ-
ment.
We can establish that :
q^aidd < q
na
idd () a < d+ 2e (15)
When e > d c2 i.e. the marginal damage of pollution is high enough,
or when e < d c2 and a < d + 2e, the above condition is always satised
because regulators care about the environment whereas non-regulated rms do
not care about the environment. However, when e < d c2 and a > d+2e i.e.
the marginal damage of pollution is low enough, socially-optimal production is
higher than the production of non-regulated monopolistic rms.
With the clean technology, socially-optimal production is always higher than
that of non-regulated rms (q^aicc > q
na
icc).
Since the production process is clean, each regulator gives his rm a subsidy
saicc for each unit produced, which can be considered as a scal incentive. One
may think about production of electricity. A per-unit production subsidy can be
given by a regulator when the production process is clean (using solar energy, for
instance). This per-unit subsidy is chosen so that it induces the socially-optimal
level of production. Indeed, the instantaneous net prot of rms i is:
Uaicc(qi) = 
a
icc(qi) + s
a
iccqi (16)
The socially-optimal per-unit subsidy that induces rm i to produce q^aicc is:
saicc = c  a+ 4q^aicc > 0 (17)
If we consider the case in which one of the two rms, for instance rm
1; has adopted the clean technology, whereas the other still produces using
the polluting technology, then the prots of rms are a1cd(q1) and 
a
2cd(q2),
respectively. The instantaneous social welfare of regulator 1 and 2 are:
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Sa1cd(q1; q2) = SC
a
1 (q1) + 
a
1cd(q1) D1(q2); (18)
Sa2cd(q1; q2) = SC
a
2 (q2) + 
a
2cd(q2) D2(q2) (19)
Regulator i maximizes his social welfare function with respect to qi to get
the socially-optimal production quantities:
q^a1cd =
a  c
2
> 0; q^a2cd =
a  d  e
2
> 0 (20)
We can easily verify that q^a1cd > q^
a
2cd meaning that it is socially preferred
that the rm using the clean technology produces more than that using the
polluting technology.
Since qna1cd = q
na
1cc < q^
a
1cd = q^
a
1cc, regulator 1 can induce rm 1 to produce the
socially-optimal production quantities by an appropriate subsidy sa1cd = s
a
1cc.
Since qna2cd = q
na
2dd > q^
a
2cd = q^
a
2dd, a per-unit emission-tax t
a
2cd = t
a
2dd is needed
to induce rm 2 to produce the socially-optimal quantity.
In the Appendix, we show that:4
0 < na1cd  na1dd < Sa1cd   Sa1dd < Ua1cd   Ua1dd (21)
Thus, we can establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 Under autarky, the instantaneous gain from using the clean
technology is greater for the rst adopter regulated rm than for its regulator.
This latter instantaneously benets more from using the clean technology than
its rst adopter non-regulated rm.
Indeed, when a regulated rm adopts the clean technology, it no longer
pays a pollution tax, receives production subsidies and its unit production costs
decreases. This increases its instantaneous net prot signicantly. The instan-
taneous social welfare level increases due to the absence of local environmental
damages and the lower production cost. However, this last increase is less im-
portant than that of the regulated rm. The only benet of a non-regulated
rm from adopting the clean technology is the reduction of its unit production
cost. Consequently, its instantaneous net prot increase is less important than
that of the instantaneous social welfare.
2.3 Optimal adoption dates
In this section, we will determine the optimal adoption dates. We still suppose
that, in case where rms adopt at di¤erent dates, the rst adopter is rm 1 and
the second adopter is rm 2. Thus, in the following expressions, we suppose
1  2.
Since qna1cd = q
na
1cc; q
na
2cd = q
na
2dd; q^
a
1cd = q^
a
1cc and q^
a
2cd = q^
a
2dd, then 
na
1cd = 
na
1cc;
na2cd = 
na
2dd; U
a
1cd = U
a
1cc and U
a
2cd = U
a
2dd. This implies that the intertemporal
4Notice that, to prove the second inequality of (21), we have supposed that  = :
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net prot of non-regulated and regulated rm i can be written as depending
only on  i:However, since Sa1cd 6= Sa1cc and Sa2cd 6= Sa2dd because of crossborder
pollution, intertemporal social welfare of regulators 1 and 2 depend on 1 and
2.
Each regulator chooses the socially-optimal adoption date that maximizes
his intertemporal social welfare function. Each regulated and non-regulated rm
chooses the optimal adoption date that maximizes its intertemporal net prot.
The intertemporal social welfare of regulators 1 and 2, intertemporal net
prots of regulated and non-regulated rm i are, respectively:
ISa1 (1; 2) =
1Z
0
Sa1dde
 rtdt+
2Z
1
Sa1cde
 rtdt+
+1Z
2
Sa1cce
 rtdt  e mr1 (22)
ISa2 (1; 2) =
1Z
0
Sa2dde
 rtdt+
2Z
1
Sa2cde
 rtdt+
+1Z
2
Sa2cce
 rtdt  e mr2 (23)
IUai ( i) =
 iZ
0
Uaidde
 rtdt+
+1Z
 i
Uaicce
 rtdt  e mr i (24)
IUnai ( i) =
 iZ
0
naidde
 rtdt+
+1Z
 i
naicce
 rtdt  e mr i (25)
In order to get positive adoption dates, we need the following condition,
which can be always veried by choosing  and/or m high enough:5
0 < Uaicc   Uaidd < mr (26)
In the Appendix, we determine the optimal adoption dates which show that
rms adopt simultaneously the clean technology:
^a =
1
(1 m)r ln

Sa1cd   Sa1dd
mr

> 0 (27)
a =
1
(1 m)r ln

Uaicc   Uaidd
mr

> 0 (28)
na =
1
(1 m)r ln

naicc  naidd
mr

> 0 (29)
Proposition 2 Because of symmetry, when markets are separated, rms adopt
the clean technology simultaneously.
5Notice that the left expression of (26) is independent of parameters , m and r:
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Inequality (21) and the fact that m > 1, enable us to make the following
ranking:
0 < a < ^a < na (30)
We can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 The optimal adoption date of regulated rms is earlier than that
socially-optimal. However, the optimal adoption date of non-regulated rms is
later than that socially-optimal.
The above proposition shows that socially-optimal instantaneous regulation
may not be dynamically optimal with respect to the adoption of clean technolo-
gies. They are due to the fact that, under autarky, the incentives to adopt are,
in order, greater for regulated rms, regulators and non-regulated rms. This is
clearly established by the inequalities in (21). This result is similar to the one
established by Ben Youssef (2010) who used a model comprising one regulator
and a monopolistic rm.
Paradoxically, if regulators desire that regulated rms delay their adoption
to the socially-optimal adoption date, they must compensate rms for the losses
they incur by this adoption delay. If the intertemporal net prots of the regu-
lated rm i are IUi(a) and IUi(^a) when the adoption dates are a and ^a,
respectively, then the postpone adoption subsidy (compensation) is:
g^a = IUi(
a)  IUi(^a) > 0 (31)
Proposition 4 When markets are separated, each regulator can push his regu-
lated rm to delay its adoption of the clean technology by giving it a postpone
adoption subsidy that compensates the rm for the losses it incurs when the
latter delays its optimal adoption date to the socially-optimal adoption date.
3 Common market
When markets are opened to competition, the inverse demand function of the
perfect substitute goods produced by rms becomes P = a  (qi + qj). The size
of the integrated market is a.
The total consumerssurplus is equally divided between the two symmetric
countries:
CScmi (qi; qj) =
1
2
24 qi+qjZ
0
P (z)dz   P (qi + qj) (qi + qj)
35 = 1
4
(qi + qj)
2
The emission-tax per-unit of pollution is tcmi and the per-unit production
subsidy is scmi :
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When rm i uses the polluting technology, its prot is given by cmid =
p(qi; qj)qi   dqi, and when it uses the clean technology, its prot is given by
cmic = p(qi; qj)qi   cqi.
The instantaneous social welfare of country i is equal to the consumers
surplus, minus damages plus the prot of the domestic rm:
Scm(qi; qj) = CS
cm
i (qi; qj) Di(qi; qj) + cmi (qi; qj) (32)
3.1 Non-regulated rms
When both rms use the polluting technology, each one maximizes its prot
ncmidd to get the optimal level of production:
qncmidd =
a  d
3
> 0 (33)
When both rms use the clean technology, each one maximizes its prot
ncmicc to get the optimal level of production:
qncmicc =
a  c
3
> 0 (34)
As for the autarky case, the clean technology enables non-regulated rms to
produce more because of its lower unit production cost (qncmicc > q
ncm
idd ) :
If only rm 1 uses the clean technology, whereas rm 2 still uses the pollut-
ing technology, then the prot of each non-regulated rm is ncm1cd and 
ncm
2cd ,
respectively. The optimal productions are given by:
qncm1cd =
a+ d  2c
3
> 0; qncm2cd =
a  2d+ c
3
< 0 (35)
The second inequality of condition (9) shows that qncm2cd < 0: Thus, the case
where the two non-regulated rms adopt at di¤erent dates is unrealistic. From
now on, we will suppose that if non-regulated rms adopt the clean technology,
then this adoption is simultaneous.
3.2 Regulated rms
When both rms use the polluting technology, the instantaneous social welfare
of regulator i is:
Scmidd(qi; qj) = CS
cm
i (qi; qj) + 
cm
idd(qi; qj) Di(qi; qj) (36)
Maximizing the expression given by (36) with respect to qi gives the socially-
optimal production level with the polluting technology for regulator i:
q^cmidd =
a  d  e
2
> 0 (37)
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Since rm i is a duopoly producing with pollution, it is regulated. A per-
unit emission-tax is su¢ cient to induce the socially-optimal level of production.
Indeed, the instantaneous net prot of rm i is:
U cmidd(qi; qj) = 
cm
idd(qi; qj)  tcmiddEi (38)
The socially-optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces rm i to produce
q^cmidd is:
tcmidd =
a  d  3q^cmidd
e
> 0 (39)
When both rms use the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare
of country i is:
Scmicc (qi; qj) = CS
cm
i (qi; qj) + 
cm
icc (qi; qj) (40)
Maximizing the expression given by (40) with respect to qi gives the socially-
optimal production level with the clean technology for each regulator i:
q^cmicc =
a  c
2
> 0 (41)
Lets notice that, because non-regulated rms dont take into account en-
vironmental damages, they always produce more than what is socially-optimal
(qncmidd > q^
cm
idd): However, with the clean technology and because of the duopolistic
distortion, non-regulated rms always produce less than what is socially-optimal
(qncmicc < q^
cm
icc ):
Since the production process is clean, each regulator gives his rm a per-unit
production subsidy scmicc ;which is chosen to induce the socially-optimal level of
production. Indeed, the instantaneous net prot of rms i is:
U cmicc (qi; qj) = 
cm
icc (qi; qj) + s
cm
iccqi (42)
The socially-optimal per-unit production subsidy that induces rm i to pro-
duce q^cmicc is:
scmicc = 3q^
cm
icc + c  a > 0 (43)
Consider the case where rm 1 has adopted the clean technology, whereas
rm 2 still produces using the polluting technology. The instantaneous social
welfare of regulator 1 and 2 are, respectively:
Scm1cd(q1; q2) = CS
cm
1 (q1; q2) D1(q2) + cm1cd(q1; q2) (44)
Scm2cd(q1; q2) = CS
cm
2 (q1; q2) D2(q2) + cm2cd(q1; q2) (45)
Maximizing expressions given by (44) and (45) respectively with respect to
q1 and q2 gives:
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q^cm1cd =
2a+ d  3c+ e
4
> 0 (46)
q^cm2cd =
2a+ c  3d  3e
4
< 0 (47)
Because of the second inequality of (9) and the rst inequality of (1), q^cm2cd <
0:We conclude that considering the case where one rm uses the clean technology
and the other one uses the polluting technology is unrealistic. Lets notice that
we have assumed the rst inequality and the second inequality of conditions
(1) and (9) to prevent the study of the complicated case where rms adopt the
clean technology at di¤erent dates. Indeed, even if it is possible to determine the
optimal adoption dates, comparing them is very di¢ cult to do in the common
market case.
Proposition 5 Under common market, due to conditions assumed on parame-
ters, rms adopt the clean technology simultaneously.
In the Appendix, we show that:
0 < ncmicc  ncmidd < U cmicc   U cmidd < Scmicc   Scmidd (48)
These inequalities enable us to establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 6 Under common market, the instantaneous gains from using the
clean technology are greater for regulators than for regulated rms. These latter
instantaneously benet more from the clean technology than non-regulated rms.
The reasons explaining the benet from the clean technology are the same
than for the autarky case. However, when regulated rms compete in a common
market, their instantaneous net prots increase, due to the adoption of the clean
technology, is less important than the increase of instantaneous social welfare
levels.
3.3 Optimal adoption dates
When both rms adopt the clean technology at the same date  , the intertem-
poral social welfare of regulator i, intertemporal net prot of the regulated and
non-regulated rm i are, respectively:
IScmi () =
Z
0
Scmidde
 rtdt+
+1Z

Scmicc e
 rtdt  e mr (49)
IU cmi () =
Z
0
U cmidde
 rtdt+
+1Z

U cmicc e
 rtdt  e mr (50)
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IUncmi () =
Z
0
ncmidd e
 rtdt+
+1Z

ncmicc e
 rtdt  e mr (51)
In the Appendix, we determine the socially-optimal adoption date for reg-
ulators, the optimal adoption date for regulated rms and non-regulated rms,
which are respectively:
^ cm =
1
(1 m)r ln

Scmicc   Scmidd
mr

> 0 (52)
cm =
1
(1 m)r ln

Uaicc   Uaidd
mr

> 0 (53)
ncm =
1
(1 m)r ln

ncmicc  ncmidd
mr

> 0 (54)
Inequality (48) and the assumption m > 1, enable us to make the following
ranking:
0 < ^ cm < cm < ncm (55)
Thus, we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 When markets are opened to competition, the socially-optimal
adoption date is earlier than the optimal adoption date for regulated rms. This
latter is earlier than the optimal adoption date for non-regulated rms.
The above proposition shows that, even in a common market, socially-
optimal instantaneous regulation may not be dynamically optimal with respect
to the adoption of clean technologies. They are due to the fact that, under
a common market, the incentives to adopt the clean technology are, in order,
greater for regulators, regulated rms and non-regulated rms. This is clearly
demonstrated by the inequalities in (48).
If regulators desire that regulated rms accelerate their adoption to the
socially-optimal adoption date, they must compensate rms for the losses they
incur by an early adoption. If the intertemporal net prots of the regulated
rm i are IUi(cm) and IUi(^ cm) when the adoption dates are cm and ^ cm,
respectively, then the early adoption subsidy (compensation) is:
g^cm = IUi(
cm)  IUi(^ cm) > 0 (56)
Proposition 8 In a common market, each regulator can push his regulated rm
to accelerate its adoption of the clean technology by giving it an early adoption
subsidy that compensates the rm for the losses it incurs when this latter accel-
erates its optimal adoption date to the socially-optimal adoption date.
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4 Autarky versus common market
Looking to expressions (27) and ( 52), we can show that:
^a = 1(1 m)r ln
 d c+e
2 (q^
a
icc+q^
a
idd)
mr

;
^ cm = 1(1 m)r ln
 d c+e
2 (q^
cm
icc+q^
cm
idd)+eq^
cm
idd
mr

The above expressions show that, under a common market, the socially-
optimal adoption date internalizes transboundary pollution. However, under
autarky, the socially-optimal adoption date does not internalize transbound-
ary pollution. Moreover, under both market regimes, optimal adoption dates
of regulated and non-regulated rms completely dont internalize transbound-
ary pollution. This is due to the fact that our damage function is linear with
respect to the total pollution. Indeed, production for non-regulated rms,
socially-optimal production and net prot of rms completely dont internal-
ize transboundary pollution.6 This result is of great interest because this paper
is the rst attempt linking adoption of clean technologies with transbound-
ary pollution. Notice that, using a very di¤erent model, Ben Youssef (2009)
showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of rms on the common mar-
ket help non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollu-
tion. Ben Youssef (2011) showed that the investment in absorptive R&D help
non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. We
can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 The socially-optimal adoption date under a common market
better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky, and than the
optimal adoption date of regulated rms. However, under both market regimes,
the optimal adoption date of non-regulated rms completely dont internalize
transboundary pollution.
Let us notice that if there were no transfrontier pollution between countries,
i.e.  = 0;then from expressions (69) and (71), we deduce that the optimal
adoption date for regulated rms and the socially-optimal adoption date co-
incide under common market (cm = ^ cm). Indeed, since the instantaneous
social welfare gain from using the clean technology internalizes transboundary
pollution causing a speedup in technology adoption, the absence of transbound-
ary pollution delays the socially-optimal adoption date to the optimal adoption
date for regulated rms. Nonetheless, under autarky, the optimal adoption date
of regulated rms still remains earlier than that socially-optimal because this
latter does not internalize transboundary pollution.
6 If damage functions were not linear with respect to total pollution nor separable with
respect to the pollution remaining at home and the one received from other countries, then
transboundary pollution would be partially internalized by socially-optimal production quan-
tities.
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The comparison of optimal production quantities shows that the competition
on the common market pushes non-regulated rms to increase their production
(qncmidd > q
na
idd; q
ncm
icc > q
na
icc):However, socially-optimal productions are the same
under the two market regimes (q^cmidd = q^
a
idd; q^
cm
icc = q^
a
icc):Consequently, when the
polluting technology is used, the per-unit emission-tax is greater under common
market (tcmidd > t
a
idd). When the clean technology is used, the per-unit produc-
tion subsidy is greater under autarky (saicc > s
cm
icc ). These results are interesting
and even surprising because one may think that, to give a competitive advan-
tage to its domestic rm, each regulator reduces the per-unit emission tax and
increases the per-unit production subsidy, when markets are opened to interna-
tional competition. Ben Youssef (2009) found a similar result with a di¤erent
model where regulatory instruments are a per-unit emission-tax and a per-unit
R&D subsidy.
Proposition 10 Opening markets to international competition increases the
per-unit emission-tax when the polluting technology is used, and decreases the
per-unit production subsidy when the clean technology is used.
In the Appendix, we show that, under a common market, the instantaneous
social welfare gain from using the clean technology is greater than the instan-
taneous social welfare gain from using the clean technology of the rst adopter
under autarky. Thus, opening markets to international trade speeds up the
socially-optimal adoption date (^ cm < ^a). Let us notice that if there were no
transfrontier pollution between countries, i.e.  = 0;then from expressions (57)
and (69), we deduce that the socially-optimal optimal adoption dates are the
same under both market regimes (^ cm = ^a).
We also deduce that the competition of regulated rms on a common market
reduces their instantaneous gain from using the clean technology with respect
to the case where markets are separated. Thus, opening markets to interna-
tional competition delays the adoption of the clean technology by regulated
rms (a < cm):
Finally, we show that the competition of non-regulated rms on a com-
mon market reduces their instantaneous gain from using the clean technology
with respect to the case where markets are separated. Therefore, international
competition delays the adoption of the clean technology by non-regulated rms
(na < ncm):
Proposition 11 International competition reduces the instantaneous gain from
using the clean technology by both non-regulated and regulated rms, with respect
to autarky. Consequently, non-regulated and regulated rms delay the adoption
of the clean technology when markets are opened to international trade. How-
ever, the instantaneous social welfare gain from using the clean technology in-
creases with market opening, leading to an acceleration of the socially-optimal
adoption date.
The above results are new and interesting because the impact of opening
markets to international trade on the timing of adoption of clean technologies
has not been previously studied.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider two countries and a monopolistic rm operating in
each country. Firms produce the same homogeneous good by using a polluting
technology that uses fossil energy. These rms can adopt a new and clean
production technology by incurring an investment cost that decreases with the
adoption date. This clean technology uses a renewable energy and therefore has
a lower per- unit production cost. We consider and compare the case where
rms are not regulated at all, and the case where each rm is regulated at
each period of time i.e. each regulator looks for static social optimality. When
rms are instantaneously regulated, a per-unit emission-tax is used when a rm
uses the polluting technology, and a per-unit production subsidy, that can be
considered as a scal incentive, is used when a rm uses the clean production
technology. We also study and compare the case where each rm operates in
a separate domestic market, and the case where rms compete in the same
common market formed by the consumers of the two countries.
Our results show that, contrary to what one may expect, international com-
petition increases the per-unit emission-tax when the polluting technology is
used, and decreases the per-unit production subsidy when the clean technology
is used.
In autarky, because our model is symmetric, both rms adopt the clean tech-
nology simultaneously. However, in a common market, because of the compe-
tition between rms, non-simultaneous adoption may occur. We impose condi-
tions on parameters to avoid the complicated case where rms adopt at di¤erent
dates, and we show that adoption is simultaneous. Indeed, even if it is possi-
ble to determine the optimal adoption dates, comparing them in the common
market case is very di¢ cult to do if adoption is not simultaneous.
Interestingly, the socially-optimal adoption date under a common market
better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky, and than
the optimal adoption date of regulated rms. However, the optimal adoption
date of non-regulated rms completely dont internalize transboundary pollu-
tion. Therefore, regulators should know how to intervene to get rms adopting
at the socially-optimal dates.
Under autarky, the instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is
greater for regulated rms than for regulators. These latter instantaneously
benet more from using the clean technology than non-regulated rms. Con-
sequently, regulated rms adopt earlier than what is socially-optimal, whereas
non-regulated rms adopt later than the socially-optimal adoption date. There-
fore, in autarky, regulators can induce rms to adopt at the socially-optimal
adoption date by giving them postpone adoption subsidies. Interestingly, the
behavior of regulators completely changes when markets are opened to interna-
tional competition.
Indeed, under a common market, the instantaneous gain from using the clean
technology is greater for regulators than for regulated rms. These latter in-
stantaneously benet more from using the clean technology than non-regulated
rms. Consequently, the socially-optimal adoption date is earlier than the op-
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timal adoption date for regulated rms. This latter is earlier than the optimal
adoption date for non-regulated rms. Therefore, in a common market, regula-
tors can induce regulated rms to adopt at the socially-optimal adoption date
by giving them speed up adoption subsidies.
Finally, international competition reduces the instantaneous benets from
using the clean technology of both non-regulated and regulated rms, with
respect to autarky. Consequently, non-regulated and regulated rms delay the
adoption of the clean technology when markets are opened to international
trade. However, the instantaneous social welfare benet from the adoption
of the clean technology is greater under common market, implying an early
socially-optimal adoption date with respect to autarky.
6 Appendix
6.1 Autarky
6.1.1 Instantaneous gains from using the clean technology
i) Social optimum
*Using expressions (7) and (18): Sa1cd Sa1dd = [a  (q^a1cd + q^a1dd)  c] (q^a1cd   q^a1dd)+
(d  c) q^a1dd   eq^a1dd
By using expressions of q^a1dd and q^
a
1cd; we get:
Sa1cd   Sa1dd =
d  c+ e
2
(q^a1cd + q^
a
1dd) > 0 (57)
*Using expressions (13) and (19): Sa2cc Sa2cd = [a  (q^a2cd + q^a2cc)  c] (q^a2cc   q^a2cd)+
(d  c)q^a2cd + eq^a2cd
By using expressions of q^a2cc and q^
a
2cd; we get:
Sa2cc   Sa2cd =
d  c+ e
2
(q^a2cd + q^
a
2cc) > 0 (58)
Given that q^aicc = q^
a
1cd and q^
a
idd = q^
a
2cd, we have:
Sa1cd   Sa1dd = Sa2cc   Sa2cd (59)
ii) Non-regulated rms
*Since qnaicc = q
na
1cd, then:
na1cd  na1dd = naicc  naidd = [a  2(qnaicc + qnaidd)] (qnaicc   qnaidd) + dqnaidd   cqnaicc
By replacing qnaidd and q
na
icc between the above brackets by their values; we
get:
na1cd  na1dd = naicc  naidd =
d  c
2
(qnaicc + q
na
idd) > 0 (60)
iii) Regulated rms
*Since qnaicc = q
na
1cd, then by using expressions (10) and (16):
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Ua1cd   Ua1dd = Uaicc   Uaidd =
[a  2 (q^aicc + q^aidd)] (q^aicc   q^aidd) + (saicc   c) q^aicc + dq^aidd + taiddeq^aidd
By changing the emission tax taidd and the production subsidy s
a
icc by their
expressions in function of q^aidd and q^
a
icc, we obtain:
Ua1cd Ua1dd = Uaicc Uaidd = 2[(q^aicc)2 (q^aidd)2] = (d c+e)(q^aicc+q^aidd) > 0 (61)
6.1.2 Comparison of instantaneous gains
*Using expressions (61) and (57), we have:
Ua1cd   Ua1dd   (Sa1cd   Sa1dd) =

2 (q^a1cd   q^a1dd)  d c+e2

(q^a1cc + q^
a
1dd)
By using expressions of q^a1cd and q^
a
1dd in the above bracketed expression, we
show that:
Ua1cd   Ua1dd   (Sa1cd   Sa1dd) > 0 (62)
*Using expressions (57) and (60), we obtain:
Sa1cd   Sa1dd   (na1cd  na1dd) = d c+e2 (q^a1cc + q^a1dd)  d c2 (qna1cc + qna1dd)
= d c2 [q^
a
1cc + q^
a
1dd   qna1cc   qna1dd] + e2 (q^a1cc + q^a1dd)
By replacing the expression of q^a1cc, q^
a
1dd, q
na
1cc, and q
na
1dd by their values in the
above brackets, we obtain:
Sa1cd   Sa1dd   (na1cd  na1dd) =
d  c
2

2a  c  d  2e
4

+
e
2
(q^a1cd + q^
a
1dd)
Using the rst inequality of condition (9), we can prove that 2a c d 2e >
0, then:
Sa1cd   Sa1dd   (na1cd  na1dd) > 0 (63)
Thus, we have the following ranking:
0 < na1cd  na1dd < Sa1cd   Sa1dd < Ua1cd   Ua1dd (64)
The instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is higher for the
rst adopter regulated rm than for its regulator, which benets more than its
non-regulated rm.
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6.1.3 Optimal adoption dates
We suppose that 1  2, meaning that, in case of non-simultaneous adoption,
rm 1 is the rst adopter and rm 2 is the second.
i) Non-regulated rms:
Firm i maximizes its intertemporal net prot IUnai ( i) given by (25) with
respect to  i:
@IUnai ( i)
@ i
= (naidd  naicc) e r i + mre mr i = 0 (65)
Equation (65) is equivalent to:
naidd  naicc + mre(1 m)r i = 0() nai = na =
1
(1 m)r ln

naicc  naidd
mr

Because of m > 1, condition (26) and inequality (64), na > 0:
We have: @
2IUnai (
na
i )
@2i
= r (naicc  naidd) e r
na
i   (mr)2e mrnai :
Using the rst order condition given by (65), we get:
@2IUnai (
na
i )
@2i
= (1 m)mr2e mrnai < 0
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veried.
ii) Regulated rms:
Firm i maximizes its intertemporal net prot IUai ( i) given by (24) with
respect to  i:
@IUai ( i)
@ i
= (Uaidd   Uaicc) e r i + mre mr i = 0 (66)
Equation (66) is equivalent to:
Uaidd   Uaicc + mre(1 m)r i = 0() ai = a =
1
(1 m)r ln

Uaicc   Uaidd
mr

Because of m > 1 and condition (26), a > 0:
We have: @
2IUai ( i)
@2i
= r (Uaicc   Uaidd) e r i   (mr)2e mr i .
Using the rst-order condition given by (66), we get:
@2IUai (
a
i )
@2i
= (1 m)mr2e mrai < 0
The second-order condition of optimality is veried.
iii) Social optimum
Each regulator maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function ISa1 (1; 2)
and ISa2 (1; 2); given by (22) and (23), with respect to 1 and 2; respectively:
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@ISa1 (1; 2)
@1
= (Sa1dd(q^
a
1dd)  Sa1cd(q^a1cd)) e r1 + mre mr1 = 0 (67)
@ISa2 (1; 2)
@2
= (Sa2cd(q^
a
2cd)  Sa2cc(q^a2cc)) e r2 + mre mr2 = 0 (68)
Equations (67) and (68) are respectively equivalent to:
Sa1dd(q^
a
1dd)  Sa1cd(q^a1cd) + mre(1 m)r1 = 0() ^a1 =
1
(1 m)r ln

Sa1cd(q^
a
1cd)  Sa1dd(q^a1dd)
mr

Sa2cd(q^
a
2cd)  Sa2cc(q^a2cc) + mre(1 m)r2 = 0() ^a2 =
1
(1 m)r ln

Sa2cc(q^
a
2cc)  Sa2cd(q^a2cd)
mr

Because of m > 1, condition (26), inequalities (64), equalities (59) and (61),
we get ^a1 > 0 and ^
a
2 > 0:
We have:8<:
@2ISa1 (1;2)
@21
= r (Sa1cd(q^
a
1cd)  Sa1dd(q^a1dd)) e r1   (mr)2e mr1
@2ISa2 (1;2)
@22
= r (Sa2cc(q^
a
2cc)  Sa2cd(q^a2cd)) e r1   (mr)2e mr2
Using rst-order conditions given by (67) and (68), we get:
@2ISa1 (^
a
1 ; 2)
@21
= (1 m)mr2e mr^a1 < 0 ; @
2ISa2 (1; ^
a
2)
@22
= (1 m)mr2e mr^a2 < 0
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veried for each regulator.
Because of equality (59), we have: ^a1 = ^
a
2 = ^
a:
6.1.4 Comparison of adoption dates
Inequality (64), the fact that na1cd na1dd = naicc naidd; Ua1cd Ua1dd = Uaicc Uaidd
and m > 1, enable us to make the following ranking:
0 < a < ^a < na
Under autarky, regulated rms adopt earlier than what is socially-desired,
while non-regulated rms adopt later.
6.2 Common market
6.2.1 Instantaneous gains from using the clean technology
i) Social optimum
*Using expressions (36) and (40):
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Scmicc   Scmidd = [a  (q^cmicc + q^cmidd)  c] (q^cmicc   q^cmidd) + (d  c)q^cmidd + (+ )eq^cmidd
By using expressions of q^cmidd and q^
cm
icc , the above bracketed expression is equal
to d c+e2 . Therefore, we have:
Scmicc   Scmidd =
d  c+ e
2
(q^cmicc + q^
cm
idd) + eq^
cm
idd > 0 (69)
ii) Non-regulated rms
*cmicc  cmidd = [a  2(qncmicc + qncmidd )] (qncmicc   qncmidd ) + dqncmidd   cqncmicc
By replacing qncmidd and q
ncm
icc between the above brackets by their values, we
get:
ncmicc  ncmidd =
d  c
3
(qncmicc + q
ncm
idd ) > 0 (70)
iii) Regulated rms
*Using expressions (38) and (42):
U cmicc  U cmidd = [a  2 (q^cmicc + q^cmidd)] (q^cmicc   q^cmidd)+(scmicc   c) q^cmicc +dq^cmidd+ tcmiddeq^cmidd
By changing the emission tax tcmidd and the production subsidy s
cm
icc by their
expressions in function of q^cmidd and q^
cm
icc , we obtain:
U cmicc   U cmidd =
d  c+ e
2
(q^cmicc + q^
cm
idd) > 0 (71)
6.2.2 Comparison of instantaneous gains
Using expressions (69), (70) and (71), we obtain:
*Scmicc   Scmidd   (U cmicc   U cmidd) = eq^cmidd > 0
*U cmicc   U cmidd   (ncmicc   ncmidd ) = d c2 (q^cmicc + q^cmidd)   d c3 (qncmicc + qncmidd ) +
e
2 (q^
cm
icc + q^
cm
idd)
Using expressions of q^cmicc ; q^
cm
idd; q
ncm
icc ;and q
ncm
idd , we get:
U cmicc   U cmidd   (ncmicc  ncmidd ) = d c36 (10a  5d  5c  9e) + e2 (q^cmicc + q^cmidd)
Because of the rst inequality of condition (9), we have 10a 5d 5c 9e >
0, and:
U cmicc   U cmidd   (ncmicc  ncmidd ) > 0
Thus, we have the following ranking:
0 < ncmicc  ncmidd < U cmicc   U cmidd < Scmicc   Scmidd (72)
Under common market, the instantaneous gain from using the clean technol-
ogy is more important for regulators than regulated rms, which benet more
than non-regulated rms.
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6.2.3 Optimal adoption dates
i) Non-regulated rms
Each non-regulated rm i maximizes its intertemporal net prot given by
(51) with respect to  :
@IUncmi ()
@
= (ncmidd  ncmicc )e r + mre mr = 0 (73)
Equation (73) is equivalent to:
ncmidd  ncmicc + mre(1 m)r = 0() ncm =
1
(1 m)r ln

ncmicc  ncmidd
mr

Because of m > 1, inequalities (79), (64) and (26), ncm > 0:
We have: @
2IUncmi ()
@2 = r(
ncm
icc  ncmidd )e r   (mr)2e mr :
Using the rst-order condition given by (73), we get:
@2IUncmi (
ncm)
@2
= (1 m)mr2e mrncm < 0
Therefore, the second-order condition of optimality is veried.
ii) Regulated rms
Each regulated rm i maximizes its intertemporal net prot IU cmi () given
by (50) with respect to  :
@IU cmi ()
@
= (U cmidd   U cmicc )e r + mre mr = 0 (74)
Equation (74) is equivalent to:
U cmidd   U cmicc + mre(1 m)r = 0() cm =
1
(1 m)r ln

U cmicc   U cmidd
mr

Because of m > 1, inequalities (78) and (26), cm > 0:
We have: @
2IUcmi ()
@2 = r(U
cm
icc   U cmidd)e r   (mr)2e mr :
Using the rst-order condition given by (74), we get:
@2IU cmi (
cm)
@2
= (1 m)mr2e mrcm < 0
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veried.
iii) Social optimum
Each regulator i maximizes his intertemporal social welfare IScmi () given
by (49) with respect to  :
@IScmi ()
@
= (Scmidd   Scmicc )e r + mre mr = 0 (75)
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Equation (75) is equivalent to:
Scmidd   Scmicc + mre(1 m)r = 0() ^ cm =
1
(1 m)r ln

Scmicc   Scmidd
mr

Using expressions (69) and (61), we show that:
Scmicc  Scmidd (Uaicc Uaidd) = d c+e2 (q^cmicc + q^cmidd)+eq^cmidd (d c+e)(q^aicc+q^aidd)
Since q^cmicc = q^
a
icc and q^
cm
idd = q^
a
idd, then:
Scmicc   Scmidd   (Uaicc   Uaidd) =  (d c+e)2 (q^cmicc + q^cmidd) + eq^cmidd
Suppose that  = ; and using the second inequality of (1), then:
Scmicc   Scmidd   (Uaicc   Uaidd) =  (d c+e)2 q^cmicc + e+c d2 q^cmidd < 0
Therefore:
Scmicc   Scmidd < Uaicc   Uaidd (76)
Because of m > 1, inequalities (76) and (26), ^ cm > 0:
We have: @
2IScmi ()
@2 = r(S
cm
icc   Scmidd)e r   (mr)2e mr :
Using the rst-order condition given by (75), we get @
2IScmi (^
cm)
@2 = (1  
m)mr2e mr^
cm
< 0:
Thus, the second-order condition of optimality is veried.
6.3 Autarky versus common market
*From expressions (57) and (69), we show that:
Sa1cd   Sa1dd < Scmicc   Scmidd (77)
This implies that ^ cm < ^a:
*From expressions (61) and (71), we show that:
U cmicc   U cmidd < Uaicc   Uaidd (78)
Since m > 1;then cm > a:
*Using expressions of qnaidd; q
na
icc; q
ncm
idd and q
ncm
icc in (60) and (70), we obtain:
ncmicc  ncmidd < naicc  naidd (79)
Since m > 1; then ncm > na:
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